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Abstract
A central feature of  public Muslim discourse over the past three decades has 
been the call to restore the shari>‘a in one form or another. Some reformers 
have proposed a new theoretical underpinning for this restoration, arguing for 
the adoption of  foundational concepts that bear little, if  any, resemblance to 
their pre-modern counterparts. A central question that ineluctably emerges 
in this aporia is: What narrative must be adopted as the representation of  
the historical shari>‘a, the shari>‘a that prevailed until the early portion of  the 
nineteenth century? If  the colonial narrative is ipso facto programmatic and 
teleological, and if  it served and still serves the purposes of  all but those of  the 
subaltern majority, then what other narrative must be adopted in the project 
of  creating the new symbiosis? And if  the jural voices of  the subaltern are 
to come in for serious consideration, then how are we to represent them, if  we 
can at all? And if  we cannot, then into what espistemic predicament, if  not a 
perennial aporia, does this throw both the privileged scholar and the reformer/
intellectual? This article does not provide answers to these questions but rather 
addresses the problematics that these and related questions raise in dealing 
with the challenge of  introducing into the modern Muslim condition one form 
of  Islamic law or another.
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A. Introduction
A central feature of  public Muslim discourse over the past three 
decades has been the call to restore the shari>‘a in one form or another. 
Some reformers have proposed a new theoretical underpinning for this 
restoration, arguing for the adoption of  foundational concepts that bear 
little, if  any, resemblance to their pre-modern counterparts.1 The majority 
of  writers and movements, however, and almost all political platforms 
appear to espouse a revival of  the historical shari>‘a or a modernized 
version thereof. What is notable about this espousal is that, despite its 
variants, it seems to hold a perception of  pre-modern shari>‘a that makes 
serious claims to objectivity. Put differently, a particular practice anchored 
in a particular law and theory is posited to have actually existed, and all 
that is needed now is simply to revive this practice subject only to certain 
modifications that accommodate the exigencies of  the modern world. 
In a sense, the recent intense focus on the maqa>s}id represent an attempt 
at partaking in this very discourse.
It is, I believe, accurate to argue that any serious project aiming 
at refashioning a conception of  the shari>‘a must claim history and pre-
modern legal culture as its frame of  reference. But which history? This 
is an eminently urgent and fundamental question. And to the extent 
of  seeking such reference, several of  the modernizing Shar‘i>-minded 
reforms seem to be, in principle, on the right track. The Western 
model has provided, for the past two centuries, the parameter for 
jural experiment, one that now appears to have failed as an exclusive 
alternative to Muslim indigenous traditions. Yet, because the need for 
legal modernization remains little contested, an aporia has resulted. The 
reconciliation between the exigencies of  modernity and the placing of  
a premium on legal “heritage” thus not only gives rise to this aporia but 
also exacerbates it epistemically. For what is involved is not merely the 
challenge of  bringing the one to coexist with the other --if  not coexist 
in a necessary state of  symbiosis, but also of  informing this symbiosis 
with a particular construction, or a particular narrative, of  legal history. 
1 A radical example is Muh}ammad Shah}ru>r whose views, intellectually impres-
sive as they are, have not been received well. For a summary of  his proposed reform, 
see Wael B. Hallaq, A History of  Islamic Legal Theories (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997), pp. 245-54. See also Dale Eickelman, “Islamic Liberalism Strikes Back,” 
Middle East Studies Association Bulletin, 27 (1993), pp. 163-68.
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That the latter constitutes a colonialist product makes the challenge all 
the more formidable. A central question that ineluctably emerges in this 
aporia is: What narrative must be adopted as the representation of  the 
historical shari>‘a, the shari>‘a that prevailed until the early portion of  the 
nineteenth century? If  the colonial narrative is ipso facto programmatic 
and teleological, and if  it served and still serves the purposes of  all 
but those of  the subaltern majority, then what other narrative must be 
adopted in the project of  creating the new symbiosis? And if  the jural 
voices of  the subaltern are to come in for serious consideration, then 
how are we to represent them, if  we can at all?2 And if  we cannot, then 
into what espistemic predicament, if  not a perennial aporia, does this 
throw both the privileged scholar and the reformer/intellectual? This 
article does not provide answers to these questions but rather addresses 
the problematics that these and related questions raise in dealing with the 
challenge of  introducing into the modern Muslim condition one form 
of  Islamic law or another.
B. The Theory
Yet, although these questions are not answerable at this stage of  
scholarly and intellectual-reformist development, a beginning must be 
made somewhere, preferably at a site that can claim centrality in the 
dialogic intersection between legal history and tradition, on the one 
hand, and the theoretical and substantive imperatives of  modernity, on 
the other. Accordingly, there is perhaps no better site to accomplish 
these analytical tasks than what has inductively emerged in post-classical 
jurisprudence as the maqa>s}id al-shari>‘a, rendered into English best as the 
“universal aims of  the law.” The claim of  this site as a supreme and, 
indeed, foundational analytical unit is due in good part to the fact that 
these aims sum up the range of  desiderata produced by the law, its 
theory and practices over several centuries, but desiderata that have been 
inferred through a spaciotemporal and empirical means. Induction in the 
law, having its own rules of  logic,3 was seen to yield conclusions that 
2 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” in Patrick Williams 
and Laura Chrisman, eds., Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory: A Reader (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1994), pp. 66-111.
3 Namely, that for purposes of  the law, incomplete induction acts as a categori-
cal and perfect induction, yielding conclusions that are demonstrative. For a detailed 
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would become, under certain conditions, the basis of  further deductive 
arguments. It is in this sphere that the theory of  maqa>s}id provided, no 
less than the mukhtas}ara>t,4 the closest simulacrum of  codification (though 
the many crucial differences must bar claims to further analogies). But 
more importantly, it is in this sphere --which squarely belonged to the 
maqa>s}id-- that the meaning, intent, purposes and weltanschauungen of  the 
law were articulated. In the context of  the dialogic intersection of  the 
post-classical and modern legal imperatives, to what extent do these 
maqa>s} id retain value in terms of  modern relevance?
An instructive point of  entry into the theory of  maqa>s}id is the 
paradigmatic domain of  ta‘li>l, the theoretic that aims to identify and 
verify the ratio legis lying behind a particular ruling. Ratios come in various 
shapes and forms, depending on the semantic-hermeneutic connection 
between the “novel” case at hand and the language of  revelation, be 
it Quranic or Sunnaic. The connection itself, Arabicate in form and 
content, is therefore determined by the quality of  the text’s relevance, 
that semantic-conceptual bridge which presumably permits the jurist 
to cross the divide between social order and what is nothing less than 
God’s textual episteme. The bridge may lie at any point on a spectrum 
that ranges from relatively clear textual evidence to a textual hint or cue. 
But God, insofar as the two primary sources are concerned, can also be 
silent. What if  such connections, however faint, are not to be found? 
What if  no textual evidence can attest, affirmatively or negatively, to a 
case for which a legal norm is sought?
The absence of  a text that bears upon a new case does not leave 
the jurist stranded. In addressing this issue, Ghaza>li> begins with the 
prototypical case involving the consumption of  inebriants.5 In the Quran, 
wine is forbidden because it possesses the property of  intoxication, 
deemed prohibited as it prevents the mind from exercising normal 
cognition, thereby leading its victim into misconduct, including the 
neglect of  religious duties and an increasing tendency to violence. If  
discussion of  this matter in Shatibi’s thought, see Wael B. Hallaq, History, p. 169.
4 Cf. Mohammad Fadel, “The Social Logic of  Taqli>d and the Rise of  the 
Mukhtas} ar,” Islamic Law and Society, 4 (1996), pp. 193-233.
5 Abu> H{a>mid al-Ghaza>li> gives a detailed discussion of  muna>saba and maqa>s}id in 
his Shifa>’ al-Ghali>l fi Baya>n al-Shabah wal-Mukhi>l wa-Masa>lik al-Ta‘li>l (Baghdad: Mat}ba‘at 
al-Irsha>d, 1390/1971), pp. 142-266.
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we were to assume, for the sake of  argument, that the Quran did not 
stipulate the reason for the prohibition, we would still, Ghaza>li> argues, 
come to the conclusion that the consumption of  alcohol is prohibited, 
and this we know because of  the harmful consequences of  inebriants. 
This, Ghaza>li> insists, amounts to reasoning on the basis of  suitability 
(muna>saba), since we, independently of  revelation, know that there is a 
certain harm in allowing the consumption of  alcohol and a particular 
benefit that accrues from its prohibition. 
Since suitability is rationally conceived and emanates neither from 
the direct nor oblique meaning of  the revealed texts, its applicability to 
the law cannot be universal. In other words, since the law cannot always 
be analyzed and comprehended in rational ways, reason and its products 
are not always in agreement with the legal premises and their conclusions. 
Suitability, therefore, may at times be relevant (mula>’im) to the law, and 
irrelevant (ghari>b) at others. No ratio legis may be deemed suitable without 
being relevant. Any irrelevant ratio becomes, ipso facto, unsuitable, and 
this precludes it from any further juristic consideration. The obligation 
to pray, for instance, is waived under circumstances of  hardship. The ratio 
of  hardship is deemed relevant to the spirit and positive commands of  
the law, since a great number of  obligatory acts cease to be obligatory 
under extreme circumstances, such as illness and travel. But in the case 
of  barring guardianship over divorced women who are of  minor age, 
suitability is irrelevant, and therefore inadmissible. A divorcee who has 
reached the age of  majority may remarry without a guardian, since she 
is thought to have acquired a sufficient degree of  experience of  worldly 
affairs during her last marriage. This reasoning, however, though equally 
applicable to the divorcee who is a minor, is considered inappropriate 
in the context of  the shari>‘a since it runs counter to the aims of  the law 
in protecting the interests and welfare of  minors. Thus, the validity of  
suitability rests on whether or not God took it into consideration as a 
legal norm, and whether or not it can be shown that the norm became 
operative when the feature of  suitability in question was also present 
in the case attested by the revealed sources. Both the operative legal 
norm and the feature of  suitability must coexist in order to satisfy the 
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requirements of  the ratio.6
Be that as it may, the ultimate goal of  suitability is thus the 
protection of  public interest (mas}lah}a) in accordance with the fundamental 
principles of  the law.7 But in determining the ratio legis by the method of  
suitability, the jurist does not deal directly with the texts, since the ratio 
is not, strictly speaking, textual. Rather, he infers it through his rational 
faculty, though it must be in agreement with what may be called the spirit 
of  the law. The law is known to prohibit that which is harmful and to 
protect and promote that which is beneficial to Muslims in this world 
and in the hereafter. For after all, if  God is a merciful and rational being 
–the assumption being that he is preeminently so– then the combination 
of  these attributes must rationally yield the conclusion that He aims to 
promote the interests of  his ‘iba>d. Although we have no demonstrative 
proof  that He should do so as a rational necessity, we are nonetheless 
left with the predominant likelihood that He does act to promote these 
objectives. In fact, the majority of, if  not all, jurists held that God acts 
according to the best interests of  his subjects. As Sha>t\ibi> put it: “The 
shari>‘a was instituted for [the promotion of] the good of  believers.”8 
It thus follows that, in the jurist’s reasoning, what is deemed 
detrimental to this good, the objective of  the law, must be avoided, 
and whatever promotes harm must be prohibited. The constant and 
consistent promotion of  benefit and avoidance of  harm are the aims of  
the law, and it is to these aims that the rational argument of  suitability 
must conform. The protection of  life (nafs), property (ma>l), religion 
(di>n), mind (‘aql) and offspring (nasl) represents a central aim of  the law. 
Accordingly, the penalty of  the murderer is death, a penalty instituted 
with the aim of  deterring homicide and preserving life. “Had it not 
6 See also Sayf  al-Di>n al-A<midi>’s discussion in Bernard Weiss, The Search for God’s 
Law: Islamic Jurisprudence in the Writings of  Sayf  al-Di>n al-A<midi > (Salt Lake City: University 
of  Utah Press, 1992), p. 619.
7 In fact, the Zaydite Shawka>ni>, expressing a Sunnite us}u>li> view, states that 
the term “muna>saba” (suitability) is interchangeable with “mas}lah}a,” “istidla>l,” and the 
“protection of  the law’s aims” (ri‘a>yat al-maqa>s}id). See Muh}ammad b. ‘Ali> al-Shawka>ni>, 
Irsha>d al-Fuh}u>l ila> Tah}qi>q al-H{aqq min ‘Ilm al-Us}u>l (Surabaya: Sharikat Maktabat Ah}mad 
b. Sa‘i>d b. Nabha>n, n.d.), p. 214.
8 Abu> Ish}a>q al-Sha>t}ibi>, al-Muwa>faqa >t fi>> Us}u>l al-Ah}ka>m, Muh}yi> al-Di>n ‘Abd al-
H{ami>d (ed.), 4 vols. (Cairo: Mat}}ba‘at ‘Ali> Muh}ammad S}ubayh}, 1970), II, 3: “al-Shari>‘a 
wud}i‘at li-mas}a>lih} al-‘iba>d.”
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been for this penalty, people would rise up, threatening with collapse 
the order of  public interest.”9 The protection of  property is effected 
in “civil” matters through imposing compensatory damages upon the 
wrongdoer or unlawful appropriator (gha>s}ib), while in criminal matters 
the thief  is punished with amputation or a stiff  discretionary penalty. 
All of  these measures are intended to protect property, the prop of  
sustenance. Offspring are protected by prohibiting fornication and 
adultery (zina>), and by imposing another stiff  penalty upon those who 
commit them. Fornication and adultery furthermore constitute not merely 
the diametrical moral and logical opposites of  marriage, but they stand 
vis-a-vis this institution as mutually exclusive. Nor is this exclusivity 
limited to the logical and the moral, for the law, with its deliberate designs, 
consciously battles zina> through the promotion of  marriage. Religion 
is protected and promoted through a) the application of  the death 
penalty to those Muslims who apostate (murtadd), and b) warring against 
nonbelievers (jiha>d). Finally, the preservation of  the mind, quintessential 
for any act of  obedience, is brought about through the prohibition on 
the consumption of  inebriants. Shawka>ni> reports that some later jurists 
(al-muta’akhkhiru>n) added a sixth category, namely, honor. For people in 
general are customarily known to sacrifice their lives and property for the 
sake of  preserving and protecting their honor, a fact that a fortiori bestows 
on honor a position superior to that of  property. A false accusation of  
unchastity (qadhf)10 has thus come to be punishable by the law precisely 
in order to promote and preserve honor. 
Being many, the aims of  the law are multi-faceted, and some are 
more fundamental than others. Ghaza>li> offers a hierarchical classification 
consisting of  three levels, the first of  which includes those aims that 
he calls essential (d}aru>riyya>t), i.e., those which we have just enumerated, 
9 Shawka>ni>, Irsha>d al-Fuh}u>l, p. 216.
10 i.e., accusing someone of  zina>. For an accusation to hold, the evidence to be 
satisfied must consist of  four male witnesses who testify as eye witnesses to the act of  
sexual intercourse. Should the four witnesses offer contradictory testimonies or should 
one of  the four be disqualifies as a witness (due to being a slave or to some criminal 
past) or withdraw his testimony (leaving only three witnesses), all four would be liable 
to the h}add punishment, which consists of  eighty lashes. See Abu> Zakariyya> Yah}ya> b. 
Sharaf  al-Di>n al-Nawawi>, Rawd}at al-T{a>libi>n, ‘A<dil ‘Abd al-Mawju>d and ‘Ali> ‘Awad (eds.)}, 
8 vols. (Beirut: Da>r al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya, n.d.), VII, p. 322.
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complemented by a class of  subsidiary aims that seek to sustain and 
enhance the essential aims. For instance, the consumption of  a small 
quantity of  wine is prohibited because it invites the consumption of  a 
larger quantity. Similarly, the acts of  looking at or touching females are 
prohibited in an effort to sustain and bolster the sanction against adultery 
and fornication, to give added support to the principal prohibitions on 
sexual misconduct. Any ratio legis determined by suitability and falling 
within these areas of  the law must be treated according to the principles 
governing this level of  maqa>s}id.
The second level, consisting of  necessary aims (h}a>jiyya>t), is 
distinguished from the first in that its neglect causes a secondary harm, 
indirectly detrimental to the categories and imperatives of  the first level. 
Examples of  necessary aims are the interests served by contracts of  rent, 
for without them the owners of  real property would not be entitled to 
protect the commercial value or usufruct of  their assets, leaving them 
exploited by others without compensation.11 This secondary but necessary 
aim – of  regulating rent – has come to serve and enhance the interests 
of  the higher and essential aim of  protecting property. The same can 
be said of  the necessity to appoint a guardian who is charged with the 
responsibility of  giving a female of  minor age in marriage. Here, no 
life is threatened and no property endangered; nevertheless, protecting 
certain interests, including those of  minors, are necessary for ensuring 
justice in, and the orderly functioning of, society. 
Finally, the third and least important level is what Ghaza>li> calls 
“improvements” (tah}si>n, tawsi‘a), which enhance the implementation of  
the higher aims of  the law in secondary ways. The slave, for instance, is 
denied the capacity to act as a witness because his menial social status and 
servitude impede his independent testimony (the assumption being that 
evidentiary rectitude is normatively guaranteed by the threat of  losing 
social capital or social standing). While this denial neither serves nor 
harms the indispensable and necessary aims (first and second levels), it 
does serve to enhance the aims of  the shari>‘a on the whole by confirming 
its principles.
Now, the aims of  the law play a significant role in determining the 
so-called al-mas}a>lih} al-mursala, a type of  reasoning applied to cases upon 
11 Shawka>ni>, Irsha>d al-Fuh}u>l, p. 216.
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which no text can be brought to bear. This was also known as istidla>l 
bil-mursal, and more generally, istidla>l.12 Shawka>ni>, one of  the last of  the 
classical jurists who had the benefit of  a cumulative knowledge of  the 
us}u>li> tradition, could sum up the various stances of  the jurists on mas}lah}a 
mursala. For many, he observed, mas}lah}a generally meant the preservation 
of  the objectives of  the law by means of  averting harm, the aim of  the 
law being social order. Yet, as Ghaza>li> held, instead of  being grounded in 
a text of  revelation, its rationale is founded in rational suitability. While 
on the one hand this type of  reasoning has been rejected by many jurists, 
Qara >fi> asserted that a thorough investigation into the matter reveals that 
all legal schools heavily resorted to the test of  suitability, the cornerstone 
of  mas}lah}a.13 When the derivation of  legal rules is predicated upon the 
test of  suitability-cum-relevancy, a good number of  jurists, including 
the H{anafites, admit it as a valid form of  reasoning. The Sha >fi‘ite legist 
Ibn Barha>n added that this position is the choice of  the jurists (al-h}aqq 
al-mukhta>r). The position seemingly adopted by the majority insists on 
mas}lah}a being “necessary, certain and universal.” By necessary it is meant 
that it must be subsumable under the five d}aru>riyya>t enumerated above, 
namely, the preservation and promotion of  life, property, religion, mind 
and offspring, and by universal, that it should encompass all Muslims. 
Ghaza>li> illustrates the meaning of  universality by the example of  a military 
conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims, wherein the unbelievers’ 
army is assumed to have captured a group of  Muslims and to be using 
them as a shield. If  the shield is not attacked, the army of  the enemy will 
succeed in its design to destroy the Muslim community. In order to repulse 
the enemy, it is necessary to attack the shield, an act that is sure to result 
in killing many, if  not all, the Muslims forming the shield. Although the 
individuals are not guilty of  any offense, and therefore do not deserve any 
penalty, much less capital punishment, mas}lah}a dictates that the killing of  
fellow Muslims is “rationally relevant” (mula>’im) in light of  the accruing 
benefits, namely, the protection of  the wider Muslim community. For 
if  such a sacrifice is not made, the enemy will defeat the Muslim army, 
destroy the community, and annihilate the shield at any rate.
12 Abu> al-Muz}affar Mans}u>r b. Muh}ammad al-Sam‘a>ni>, Qawa>t}i‘ al-Adilla fil-Us}u>l, 2 
vols. (Beirut: Da>r al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya, 1997), II, p. 259; Shawka>ni>, Irsha>d al-Fuh}u>l, p. 242.
13 Shawka>ni>, Irsha>d al-Fuh}u>l, p. 242: “qa>la al-Qara >fi> hiya ‘inda al-tah}qi>q fi> jami>‘ al-
madha>hib li’annahum yaqu>mu>n wa-yaq‘idu>n bil-muna>saba.”
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Entailed by Ghaza>li>’s example (famously known as mas’alat al-turs) 
is the certainty that the shari>‘a aims at minimizing killing when killing 
cannot be averted at all. The killing of  the persons forming the shield 
thus emerges as a rational certainty that is at once suitable, a certainty 
that must be so compelling as to override the legal consideration that 
no innocent soul should be punished in any manner, much less killed.14 
However, the claim to certainty and its “suitable” conclusions will not 
stand should there be any chance that the army of  the enemy may not, 
in any case, win the battle. On the other hand, the claim to universality is 
rendered problematic should the situation in question not pose a threat 
to the entire community. If  a ship were to be on the verge of  sinking, it 
is deemed categorically prohibited to jettison some passengers in order 
to save the ship even though it might appear that such an act will save 
the day.15 Needless to say, the extremely hypothetical nature of  mas’alat 
al-turs did not escape Ghaza>li>’s colleagues who retorted, inter alia, that the 
average case in the law does not involve the entire community. Ghaza>li>’s 
point, however, appears to be the balance in favor of  certainty that bears 
on what might be called general public interest, that which affects the 
community at large. 
C. Modern Encounters
There is little doubt that one of  the major problems facing Muslim 
legal thinkers today is coping, under modern conditions, with the weight 
of  what I have elsewhere called the Arabicate hermeneutic,16 that juristic 
tradition which assumes a dense linguistic link between the law and the 
revealed sources. The link is also specifically Arabicate in the sense that, 
irrespective of  the identity of  the national and ethnic group that aims 
to apply the shari>‘a to itself, the sources of  the law and the means of  
their interpretation remain bound by the rules of  the Arabic language. 
Even when the ethnic and national character of  the group is seen to 
predetermine the law, as happened in the case of  certain Indonesian legal 
14 Abu> H{a>mid al-Ghaza>li>, al-Mustas}fa> min ‘Ilm al-Us}u>l, 2 vols. (Cairo: al-Mat}ba‘a 
al-Ami>riyya, 1324/1906), I, p.284; Shawka>ni>, Irsha>d al-Fuh}u>l, p. 242.
15 Shawka>ni>, Irsha>d al-Fuh}u>l, p. 242-43.
16 Wael B. Hallaq, Shari>‘a: Theory, Practice, Transformations (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), pp. 500-42.
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thinkers (mainly with regard to the rules of  inheritance),17 the reasoning 
which aimed to bring the Quran to bear on this specific character could 
not avoid addressing the hermeneutics and linguistic structures of  the 
revealed text. Thus, even in this radical nationalist exercise, the point of  
departure was a struggle with the Arabicate hermeneutic.
The linguistic hegemony of  Arabicate fiqh appears to be daunting. 
It would not be an exaggeration to state that almost all modern 
legal thinkers attempting to make sense of  Islamic law in the face of  
modernity, be they Malaysian, Indonesian, Arab or otherwise, have 
grappled with this hegemony. Rashi>d Rid}a >, one of  the first modern 
legal “reformers,” resorted to a notion of  mas}lah}a that culminated in a 
near-total abandonment of  the revealed texts in favor of  a utilitarian 
construction of  positive law.18 Arguably, his juristic rationalization either 
led to or, at least, encouraged the westernization of  both the substance 
and form of  law in many Arab countries, a phenomenon seen today as 
intrusive and alien. The Pakistani intellectual Fazlur Rahman proffered 
his Double-Movement Theory in a clear effort to thwart the Arabicate 
linguistic hegemony, reducing the constitutive Islamic legal element to an 
understanding of  the situational “intent” of  the Lawgiver. His project is 
one about contexts and general intentionalities, but certainly not about the 
meaning and significance of  individual words and prepositions.19 Judging 
by the manner in which he was received in his native country, and by what 
the course of  “Islamicization” in Pakistan has been, his project can hardly 
be described as successful. Likewise, the Syrian engineer-turned-jurist 
Muh}ammad Shah}ru>r managed to develop a theory of  law that entirely 
escapes the Arabicate hermeneutics, although it does erect an interpretive 
apparatus of  its own.20 Of  all these proposed programs, Shah}ru>r’s has – 
now with the benefit of  hindsight -- been the least well-received.
The most salient problem facing legal modernizers may be captured 
in the contrast between the essential qualities defining language, especially 
17 See Mark Cammack, “Islamic Inheritance Law in Indonesia: The Influence 
of  Hazairin’s Theory of  Bilateral Inheritance,” The Australian Journal of  Asian Law, 4, 
1 (2002), pp. 295-315.
18 Wael B. Hallaq, History, pp. 214-20.
19 Wael B. Hallaq, History, pp. 241-45; Tamara Sonn, “Fazlur Rahman’s Islamic 
Methodology,” Muslim World, 81 (1991), pp. 212-30.
20 Wael B. Hallaq, History, pp. 245-53.
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one of  Quranic pedigree, and modernity. However much we believe 
that the reader constructs the text, it is at least equally true that words 
have meanings whose range cannot but stop at a particular point in the 
semantic field. For any (legal) reasoning to gain legitimacy, it must, as 
a first and minimal condition, be believable to its intended audience. 
Believability is also a necessary, though clearly insufficient, condition for 
acquiring legitimacy; and legitimacy, or lack of  it, is after all constitutive 
of  what may accurately be called a Muslim legal predicament. Especially 
with the centuries-old weight of  linguistic tradition, Quranic-Sunnaic 
language has been endowed with meanings whose semantic range is 
perforce narrower than that which emerged during the twentieth century. 
The modern condition has pushed back the limits of  this range, but only 
to a limited extent. Despite its malleability, the semantic field remains 
limited: a word’s connotation, as a rule, cannot be turned into its opposite.
It is precisely in the “liquidity” and “progress”21 of  modernity that 
the contrast becomes clear. A run away train,22 so to speak, modernity 
has brought about ever-changing conditions with which the semantic 
fields of  the Quran and the Sunna cannot hope to catch up. The changes 
brought about by nation-states in the field of  positive law can hardly 
be said to emanate from any legitimate hermeneutic, especially as their 
basis and method are constituted by no more than the will-to-power of  
the state itself. And the proposed projects of  the so-called intellectual 
Islamic and Islamist reforms have all been caught up, without a successful 
conclusion, in the opposition between the relatively limited semantic field 
and the constantly changing conditions of  modernity, be they social, 
moral, economic, technological or otherwise.
If  the semantic field is no longer able to constitute the hermeneutical 
foundations of  the law, then what alternative is there? The utilitarian/
secularist approach to legal construction, we have already intimated, has 
proven to lack legitimacy in most parts of  the Muslim world. Can, then, 
the five universals of  d}aru>riyya>t, together with mas}a>lih} mursala, form a new 
foundation of  legal reasoning? After all, these universals -- having been 
21 See, among others, Zygmunt Bauman, Liquid Modernity (Oxford: Polity Press, 
2000); Jean-François Lyotard, The Post-Modern Condition (Minneapolis: University of  
Minnesota Press, 1985); Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of  Modernity (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1990).
22 In all likelihood, the expression is not mine.
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inductively constituted on the basis of  both the revealed texts and the law 
that has presumably emanated therefrom over the centuries -- represent 
the total sum of  values upon which the shari>‘a as well as Islam as religion 
and culture have placed a premium.
If  we subsume Shawka>ni>’s category of  “honor” under that of  
“offspring” (as they are interconnected in many ways), it will become 
obvious that out of  the five maqa>s}id universals, no less than four (religion, 
life, property and offspring) present significant challenges in coping with 
modernity’s condition. First, little need be said about religion which 
stands in paradigmatic antithesis with a largely secular modern world. 
Once a criterion by which communities defined themselves and were 
defined by others, it has become, under the secularism of  the nation-
state, a marginalized definitional element. It is no longer required of  the 
by-gone denizen to believe in religion, this requirement having been 
replaced by a national ideology whose main objective is the near-total 
pacification of  an otherwise materially productive citizen. The upshot 
of  all this is that the category of  the “national citizen” has displaced 
religious loyalty as the hallmark of  political identity, with the distinct 
implication that the protection and promotion of  religion as defined by 
the maqa>s}id universals is no longer compatible with the status of  religion 
under the modern nation-state. Under the latter, it is true, religion has 
become a private matter, a natural right of  which no individual should 
be deprived. But this right cannot, at least in theory and in law, be turned 
into a political privilege. Accordingly, with this transmutation into the 
political ideology of  national citizenry, the ahl al-dhimma laws of  fiqh are 
rendered problematic, at least as set by the standards of  the so-called 
universal human rights and as these standards continue to be harnessed 
as a means of  pressure and interference by the colonialist and quasi-
colonialist western states. The fact that the laws of  the Muslim countries 
of  today have largely been determined by the direct and indirect control 
of  these states complicates all possible options, which in their oppositions 
and syntheses may not prove viable. In other words, the practice of  an 
exclusively classical ahl al-dhimma doctrine has been thoroughly quashed 
by the socio-economic and legal transformations in most parts of  the 
Muslim world, especially as manifested in the collapse of  local community 
structures (exemplified by villages and city quarters) and the pre-modern 
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legal sociology and laws that governed them. On the other hand, the 
transplantation of  a purely western-type law, which would – in theory 
-- fully accommodate the demands made by the universal conception 
of  human rights, has proven to be antithetical to indigenous interests 
and ways of  life. It is an option for which Muslims in general seem to 
have lost taste. And the synthesis between (and admixture of) these two 
extremes has not proven to be a happy mean, assuming that the post-
colonial condition is a synthesis at all.
Second, and related to the first, is the “preservation of  life,” where 
the challenge is posed by the deterrent of  capital punishment. This latter is 
increasingly facing opposition from several international quarters, despite 
the egregious indifference of  the United States (with about three dozen 
states that continue to mete out this punishment). However, the difficulty 
arising in this context is representative of  multiple problems running 
the full gamut of  the law, namely, the role of  the state in the criminal 
sphere. Whereas Islamic law and the Quran defined homicide as a private 
wrong to be settled by mediation and arbitration, and regulated by general 
guidelines that allowed for retaliation, compensation or forgiveness (the 
middle category being the most commonly practiced), the nation-state 
appropriated this sphere both in Europe and the colonized Muslim world. 
In fact this appropriation (together with commercial law) was consistently 
one of  the first acts of  colonialist legal change. Retaliation became at that 
point the prerogative of  the state, which not only claimed entitlement to 
the lives of  its subjects but also introduced its own evidentiary procedures, 
declared to be more “effective” than their “lax” equivalent propounded 
by Islamic law.23 This is not to say that deterrence, the central point of  
maqa>s}id, cannot be achieved through the agency of  the modern nation-
state, but it is to assert the point that, inasmuch as dealing with homicide 
is a fundamental function of  the law, dealing with punishment and its 
social ill-effects are just as important. Islamic law dealt with it within 
communal bounds, and in terms set by the community’s internal interests, 
needs and desires. The modern nation-state has progressively ignored 
the interests of  these communities whose structures and ways of  life it 
has never stopped transforming.
23 See, for example, Radhika Singha, Despotism of  Law: Crime and Justice in Early 
Colonial India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), 2, pp. 49-75.
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The third challenge is the range of  implications arising from 
the universal principle of  “protecting offspring,” the prohibition on 
fornication and adultery and their dialectical relationship with the laws 
of  marriage in particular and those related to public morality in general. 
With the emergence of  a modern type of  public sphere and the role 
of  women in it, these restrictions – which essentially govern females – 
have been largely forced out of  the nation-state’s law. Many of  the new 
codes of  family law in Muslim countries have come to encompass labor 
laws that permit women to engage in a range of  conduct in the public 
space and have excluded from their purview all quasi-ritual rules about 
touching and looking at the female body.24 Very few codes nowadays 
continue to prohibit women from exercising their right to work, so 
that with this newly acquired right, a husband’s control over his wife’s 
freedom of  movement has, in some spheres, diminished considerably. 
These changes, effected as much by legislation as by the fundamental 
transformations in the mode of  economic production, have altered 
religious morality in structural ways, and have significantly reduced both 
its scope and qualitative effects. That morality once regulated sexuality 
and that the latter has invariably had a direct bearing on the category 
of  “offspring,” are matters that hardly need comment. What needs to 
be addressed is rather the compatibility of  modern morality -- or more 
accurately, counter-morality -- with the paramount status Muslims had 
assigned to sexuality and “offspring.” And the same problematic that 
has arisen earlier with other maqa>s}id universals must be addressed here 
too. How do the massive waves of  legal westernization in the Muslim 
world square with the socially-embedded cultural ideals and desiderata 
that Muslims have developed over the centuries? How does any change 
in positive law, most particularly those occurring in line with the broad 
program of  western feminism, reduce the centrality and effect of  this 
universal, rendering it devoid of  any substantive significance? Can 
24 But I argue, along with Chatterjee, that these acts do not amount to women’s 
liberation, for the state and its nationalism “conferred upon women the honor of  a 
new social responsibility and by associating the task of  female emancipation with the 
historical goal of  sovereign nationhood, bound them to a narrow, and yet entirely 
legitimate, subordination.” See Partha Chatterjee, “Colonialism, Nationalism, and 
Colonized Women: The Contest in India,” American Ethnologist, 16, 4 (1989): 622-33, 
at 29, but also see pp. 63-32.
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western feminism, with its colonialist stance,25 as well as so-called Islamic 
feminism, be accommodated – howsoever partially – while keeping the 
constitutive elements of  this socio-moral category intact? This no doubt 
constitutes an immediate challenge, and one with which great many 
Muslim countries will have to deal sooner than later.
A significant obstacle impeding a forthright examination of  this 
challenge is the close connection between morality and the nature 
of  the material system that evolved in tandem with modernity in a 
complex dialectical way; for it is undeniable that modernity arose out of  
capitalism as much as capitalism arose out of  modernity. One can safely 
argue, I think, that the modern project in any society cannot succeed or 
sustain itself  for long without the adoption of  an essentially capitalist 
economy.26 The recent collapse of  the Soviet Union, the doomed struggle 
of  Castro’s Cuba, and the subsequent economic transformations in 
China and Vietnam are abundant testimonies to this. And if  we accept 
this premise, we are faced with a double-pronged challenge: How will 
Muslims cope with the direct and massive indirect effects of  capitalism 
on their culture-specific moralities, and, more importantly (which is our 
fourth point), how do they aim to deal with the maqa>s}id universal relative 
to property defined as encompassing more than the reductionist notion 
of  the sacrosanct entitlement to own wealth and protect it? How can 
“Islamic capitalism” – which grew in the shadow of  the shari>‘a and was 
for centuries highly conducive to the evolution of  a distinct yet grandiose 
material, intellectual and spiritual culture – be prevented from slipping 
into the socially and morally troublesome forms of  unrestrained modern 
capitalism?
Except for the category of  “mind,” therefore, all maqa>s}id universals 
are plagued by considerable dilemmas, all of  which in turn stem from 
25 Chandra T. Mohanty, “Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colo-
nial Discourse,” in P. Williams and l. Chrisman, eds., Colonial Discourse and Post-colonial 
Theory: A Reader (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), pp. 462-82; M. Dube, 
“Postcolonial, Feminist Spaces, and Religion,” in L. E. Donaldson and K. Pui-lan, 
eds., Postcolonialism, Feminism, and Religious Discourse (New York: Routledge, 2002), pp. 
100-17; Uma Narayan, “The Project of  Feminist Epistemology: Perspectives from a 
Nonwestern Feminist,” in S. Harding, (ed.), The Feminist Standpoint Theory Reader (London: 
Routledge, 2004), pp. 213-24.
26 In this context, see I. Wallerstein, The Modern World-System, vols. I and II (New 
York: Academic Press, 1974, 1980); vol. III (San Diego: Academic Press, 1989).
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trenchant features of  modernity. I have suggested that modern, western-
style capitalism has ineluctably reshaped the social landscape which 
pre-modern Islamic law had presupposed as its operative setting. Yet, 
the effects of  capitalism can hardly exceed those brought about by the 
importation of  the concept and practice of  the nation-state into the 
Muslim world. And it is precisely here that a further complication to the 
significance of  maqa>s}id and their place in remapping the legal landscape 
arises. It would hardly be an exaggeration, I believe, to suggest that there 
is virtually no problem or issue in the modern legal history of  Islam that 
does not hark back to the discord between the thoroughly indigenous 
Islamic/customary law and the European-grown import that was the 
nation-state.27
D. An “Ecological” Misfit?
A conceptual analysis of  the disharmony between Islamic law and 
the nation-state (mainly after the middle of  the nineteenth-century) is 
foundational, in that all chronological accounts of  the permutations in 
modern Islamic legal systems presuppose and rest upon the analytical 
difference between the pre-existing system (largely, but by no means 
exclusively, defined by the shari>‘a) and the system that came to replace it 
(i.e., the nation-state).28 The first and starkest feature that renders them 
incompatible is that both essentially belong to the same genus in that 
they are, in their own way, machines of  governance. Both are designed 
to organize society and to resolve disputes that threaten to disrupt their 
respective orders – however different from each other these orders are. 
Second, and more specifically, both are legally productive 
mechanisms or, to put it simply, law-givers. But couldn’t they, as organs 
bearing the same specialization, co-exist? The short answer must be 
in the negative. Judged by historical experience (a venue that perforce 
27 There is a great merit to the argument that one of  the chief  problems that 
encounter the recently fashionable projects of  “nation-building” is the fact that the 
nation-state that is being exported to Muslim countries has required over five centuries 
of  history to develop in Europe, when nowadays it is expected to be adopted and fully 
incorporated in non-Western countries within a decade, if  not less.
28 For a general background essay, see Wael B. Hallaq, “Juristic Authority vs. 
State Power: The Legal Crises of  Modern Islam,” Journal of  Law and Religion, 19, 2 
(2003-2004), pp. 243-58.
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renders complex any definition), Islamic law could and did accommodate 
a measure of  legal intervention by the political sovereign, but never did 
this measure exceed the peripheral and the marginal, especially in terms of  
determining the substance of  the law. (This relative jural independence is 
not to be confused with the proposition that the formation of  Islamic law 
was to some degree affected by the institutions of  political governance, a 
proposition which renders the shari>‘a’s marked independence even more 
remarkable.) While it is a given that Islamic law under the Ottomans – the 
most state-like dynasty of  Islam --29 was administered by means of  state 
apparatus, the corpus juris applied was overwhelmingly of  shar‘i> pedigree. 
Thus, while Islamic law is tolerant of  administrative competition, it is only 
thinly tolerant of  substantive juristic intervention. The nation-state, on 
the other hand – also judged by the very fact of  its historical evolution 
--30 had developed even less tolerance to legislative, administrative 
and bureaucratic competition. Its staunchly centralized nature ab initio 
precluded any palpable tolerance of  other governing systems.31
Third, in theory as well as in practice, both systems claim ultimate 
sovereignty, and it is precisely this opposition that gives rise to serious 
questions as to who determines the maqa>s}id’s content, form or otherwise. 
For, at least in juristic political theory, government (siya>sa) is subservient 
to the shari>‘a.32 The raison d’etre of  siya>sa (whose invocation must always 
presuppose and announce the presence of  the civil population) is to serve 
the interests of  the law, not the other way round. That legal sovereignty 
29 It is imminently arguable that the Ottoman Empire during the fifteenth century 
and all of  the sixteenth had developed as efficient bureaucracy and administration as 
Atlantic Europe had done during the same period. For an insightful analysis, see Rifa‘at 
Abou-El-Haj, Formation of  the Modern State: The Ottoman Empire, Sixteenth to Eighteenth 
Centuries (Albany: State University of  New York Press, 1991).
30 For an excellent account of  the rise of  the nation-state, see Martin van Crev-
eld, The Rise and Decline of  the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
31 It is of  course readily admitted, as Sally Merry argues (“Legal Pluralism,” Law 
and Society Review, 22, 5 [1988], pp. 869-901), that there exist “competing, contesting, 
and sometimes contradictory orders outside state law,” but the overwhelming scholarly 
attention to the centrality of  state law, and the relatively faint struggle to bring in the 
discipline of  legal pluralism to counterbalance it, are, in themselves, abundant testimony 
to the pervasive nature and dominant weight of  the state and its law.
32 See ‘Ali> b. Muh}ammad al-Ma>wardi>, al-Ah}ka>m al-Sult}a>niyya (Cairo: Da>r al-Fikr, 
1983), p. 3.
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remained, in both theory and practice, within the realm of  the shari>‘a 
is a fact that hardly squares with the modern nation-state’s totalistic 
appropriation of  this paramount form of  sovereignty. A nation-state 
without jural sovereignty is no state at all.
Fourth, Islamic law and the nation-state operated in two opposing 
directions, the latter compelling and pushing towards an exclusive and 
ultimate center, and the former demonstrably centrifugal. As typical 
of  Islamic structures (evident in social organization, urban and rural 
economic organization, mosque architecture, and pre-modern dynastic 
bureaucracies),33 the law operated horizontally, so to speak. Aside 
from judicial appointments which were nominally, if  not symbolically, 
hierarchical, the administration of  justice was largely, if  not exclusively, 
limited to the self-structured legal profession. If  there was a hierarchy, 
it was within the profession itself, and was in nature epistemic rather 
than political or social. Yet, the hierarchy within Islamic law was largely34 
universal and self-sufficient, unlike the hierarchy existing in the judicial 
system of  the nation-state, a hierarchy that ultimately reports to the 
higher corporate orders of  the nation-state. The referential authorities of  
the qa>d}i> were learned mufti>s and author-jurists. Hard cases were decided 
with the juristic assistance of  the mufti>, and appeals did not usually travel 
upwards in a hierarchy, but were heard by the succeeding judge.35 And 
even when some complaints were made to the highest offices of  the 
“state” (as happened in the Ottoman Empire), they were made directly 
and given – with explicit intention – the personal attention of  the ruler. 
Yet more often than not the ruler would send them back to the shari>‘a 
judge. This was a personal form of  justice, not corporate. By contrast, 
the nation-state’s jural system is perforce hierarchical from within, and 
33 With the partial exception of  the Ottomans (see n. 29, above). More generally, 
see Louise Marlow, Hierarchy and Egalitarianism in Islamic Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997).
34 This is to allow for the occasional but informal complaints that were made 
to the ruler or provincial governor, a practice falling under the rubric of  maz}a>lim. See J. 
Nielsen, Secular Justice in an Islamic State (Leiden: Nedelands Historisch-Archaeologisch 
Instituut, 1985); F. Zarinebaf-Shahr, “Ottoman Women and the Tradition of  Seeking 
Justice in the Eighteenth Century,” in M. Zelfi (ed.) Women in the Ottoman Empire (Leiden: 
Brill, 1997), pp. 253-96.
35 The successor review system was made tenable by virtue of  the fact that judges 
served for short periods of  time, an average of  six months to two years.
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answers to a state hierarchy that is external to it, but one that both sustains 
and envelops it.
Fifth, and stemming from the preceding consideration, is the 
central fact that Islamic law is a grass-root system that takes form and 
operates within the social universe; it travels upward with diminishing 
velocity to effect, in varying degrees and forms, the modus operandi of  
the pre-modern “state” (by definition a minimal political, bureaucratic, 
administrative organization). The jurists emanate from the very society 
and societal culture that they serve, and the law as ideology and doctrine 
requires that they be, and continue to be, so. It is one of  the most 
striking features of  Islamic law, as a substantive and jural system, that 
it is generated at the very social level on which it was applied. In sharp 
contradistinction, the law of  the nation-state (however democratically 
representative of  the “people’s concerns”) is superimposed from a 
center in a downward direction, first originated by the mighty powers 
of  the state apparatus and thereafter deployed – in a highly structured 
but deliberately descending movement -- to the individuals of  the social 
order, those individuals who are harnessed as national citizens (fathers 
and mothers in the nation’s families; economically productive agents; 
tax-payers; soldiers, etc.). A society subject to Islamic law is one that is 
largely self-governing, whereas a society subject to the nation-state is one 
that is ruled36 from above. If  men (and now women) run the modern 
bureaucracy and make law on behalf  of  the corporate entity that is the 
nation-state, then the latter, as M. Weber and S. Qut}b aptly observed, is 
little more than “the rule of  man over man.”37
Sixth, and finally, while Islamic law and the nation-state shared the 
general goal of  organizing society and adjudicating disputes, they did so 
to significantly different effects. Intrinsic to its behavior, the nation-state 
is systemically and systematically geared towards the homogenization of  
both the social order and the national citizen; and to accomplish these 
36 Wael B. Hallaq, Shari>>‘a, pp. 159-221.
37 For Weber, see Peter Lassman, “The Rule of  Man Over Man: Politics, Power 
and Legitimation,” in Stephen Turner (ed..), The Cambridge Companion to Weber (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 83-98; For Sayyid Qut}b, Milestones (Cedar 
Rapids: The Mother Mosque Foundation, 2003), pp. 94-95, and passim.
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goals, it engages in systemic surveillance, discipline and punishment.38 
Its educational and cultural institutions are designed to manufacture the 
“good citizen” who is respectful of  the law, submissive to notions of  order 
and discipline, industrious and productive. Discipline-cum-punishment 
is integral to, and a unique feature of, the modern nation-state. The 
resultant “good citizen” is one who can efficiently serve the state, the father 
– and much less frequently the mother -- of  all. Obedience to the law, 
which presupposes submission and – more importantly -- discipline, is 
then the prop upon which the state rests. Without the law and its tools 
of  surveillance and punishment, no state apparatus can exist. Ergo, the 
centrality of  the element of  violence, and of  the threat to use it, in the 
definition of  the nation-state. The state, insofar as I am aware, is the only 
entity in human history that has arrogated to itself  the exclusive right to 
exercise violence or to threaten its use. That the citizen has accepted – or 
has been conditioned into accepting – this right of  the state is perhaps 
the most salient success of  its project. Islamic law, by contrast, has not 
concerned itself  with creating the national citizen, and to this extent, 
it shares none of  the features of  the nation-state in this regard. Aside 
from its higher transcendental aims, Islamic law had little interest in the 
social order beyond resolving disputes in the least possible disruptive 
manner to this order. Obedience to God, the nominal and theoretical 
function of  Islamic law, was manifested in communal existence. He who 
breached communal harmony was deemed to have violated God’s law. 
That the general goal of  Islamic law has always and everywhere been to 
restore individuals -- to the best extent possible – to their social positions 
remains one of  the most valid generalizations about this legal system.39 
Put differently, unlike the punitive-oriented state which created the citizen 
only to subdue him/her along with society at large, Islamic law mediated 
conflicts and arbitrated disputes in a constant effort to mend the ruptures 
of  the social fabric. Its prescribed harsh punishments, whenever applied 
(and mostly they were not), were conceived of  as exemplary, intended 
to deter the forces of  corruption which nearly always translated into 
disrupting social harmony. But it seems also true that, because Islamic law 
38 M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Bith of  the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan 
(New York: Vintage Books, 1995); ibid; Paul Rabinow (ed.), The Foucault Reader (New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1984), pp. 169-256.
39 Wael B. Hallaq, Shari>>‘a, pp. 164-76.
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never constituted part of  a machinery of  coercive justice, its prescribed 
penalties represented the furthest limit to human conduct. This did not 
mean that punishment was applied wherever an infraction took place 
(which explains why every large Middle Eastern city boasted, among other 
subversive features, a healthy population of  prostitutes) but the limit was 
designed as a possible invocation against excesses whenever there was 
enough social force to call for the strict application of  penalties. (This 
feature of  Islamic law perhaps explains why the British, among other 
colonialists, thought of  Islamic criminal law as unduly lenient, lacking 
in punishments, inefficient, and conducive neither to the propagation of  
discipline nor to the imposition of  “law and order.” This also explains 
why Islamic penal law was one of  the first corpuses of  law to be replaced 
by western criminal codes.)
While both Islamic law and the nation-state were constituted as 
governing organs that by necessity were law-givers, they fundamentally 
differed in the articulation of  their modus operandi and ultimate objectives 
(a fact that should constantly be borne in mind when speaking of  the 
modern functions of  the maqa>s}id). As universal lawgivers, the two systems 
are mutually exclusive. And since their aims and weltanschauungen were so 
different, such coexistence was precluded a priori. It is this teleological 
difference that pitted the state against Islamic law. In this competition, the 
latter had no chance of  withstanding the assault, much less of  winning 
the jural war, against an entity that is powerfully capitalistic, intrusively 
bureaucratic-administrative and intensely militaristic. The victory of  the 
nation-state was not only one of  displacing Islamic law, but also one 
which entailed the “reordering” of  Muslim social structures. The Muslim 
believer had to be converted into the “good national citizen.” The rest 
is legal history.
On a more specific analytical level, the nation-state confronted 
Islamic law as a purely legislative entity, our second point above. The 
nation-state’s jural modus vivendi was codification, a method that entails 
a conscious harnessing of  a particular tool of  governance. The maqa>s}
id, however articulated or interpreted, must now fit into this new reality. 
Codification is a deliberate choice in the exercise of  legal and political 
power, a choice that at once accomplishes a multitude of  tasks. The most 
essential feature of  the code is the production of  order, clarity, concision 
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and authority.40 Modern codes and acts, the legal experts agree, have come 
to replace “all previous inconsistent customs, mores, and law,”41 those 
very relations that produced Islamic law and its maqa>s}id philosophy. This 
replacement is also totalistic, since codes must also fulfill the requirement 
of  completeness and exclusivity. They must comprehensively cover 
the area they claim to regulate, an act that perforce precludes both the 
substantive application and – equally significant -- the authority of  any 
competing law. Where exceptions are made permitting the co-existence 
of  other forms of  (pre-existing) law, it is only by virtue of  permission 
granted by such codes. In other words, modern codes always claim 
exclusive and superior authority, over and above all previous law.
Nor is this all. Codes must be systematic and clear, arranged 
rationally and logically, and rendered easily accessible to lawyers and 
judges;42 and it is into this legal landscape that the maqa>s}id, once again, 
must be fitted. By their very nature, codes are not only declaratory and 
enunciating of  their own authority, but also universal in their statement 
of  rules; hence their conciseness. They pay no direct attention to the 
individual, whether it is the particular case or the human individual. As 
an enhancement of  this feature, they are always abstract, “to the point,” 
and deliberately preclusive of  the concrete. It was, for instance, held 
to be a virtue that the “French and German Civil Codes could be held 
within the boards of  a volume while the common law required a full 
library.”43 But the premium attribute of  the code is its capacity to create 
uniformity, an attribute subsidiary to the universal modern condition as 
an uncompromisingly homogenizing one. This also explains why it was 
to the civil codes of  Western Europe – and not to the English Common 
Law -- that the Afro-Asian reformers turned. Thus, codes must create 
uniformity not only within themselves, but also in their application. The 
40 Ferdinand F. Stone, “A Primer on Codification,” Tulane Law Review, 29 (1954-
55), pp. 303-10, at pp. 303-04, acknowledges that codification is a tool of  the state, 
including its reformers, as well as a means to effect a “new economic and social order,” 
but all this harks back at a single function of  codification, namely, “to state the law 
clearly and concisely.”
41 S. A. Bayitch, “Codification in Modern Times,” in A. N. Yiannopoulos (ed.), 
Civil Law in the Modern World (Kingsport: Louisiana State University Press, 1965), pp. 
161-91, at 164.
42 This, according to Stone (“Primer,” 303-04), being the raison d’etre of  the code.
43 Stone, “Primer,” p. 306.
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sway of  the code’s authority therefore overextends its own definition 
and encroaches upon the administration and implementation of  justice.44
Islamic law, on the other hand, runs counter to the great majority of  
the code’s attributes. First, Islamic law did not lay any claim to exclusive 
authority. In fact, it depended on the cooperation of  customary and royal 
law (siya>sa shar‘iyya), the former being the systemic prop upon which 
morality meshed into law as a “rational” system. Nowhere did Islamic 
law operate exclusively, and everywhere customary law was entwined 
with it in the realm of  practice. Nor, in this connection, was Islamic law 
declaratory, in that it never pronounced itself  as the bearer of  exclusive 
authority, as having come to replace others in the field. By its hermeneutic 
and highly individualistic nature, Islamic law was not systematic according 
to the European perception of  the world, although an expert in it might 
have viewed the matter entirely otherwise. Similarly, from a modern 
perspective, Islamic law has been described as obscure and complex, 
unlike the “clear and accessible” code. While the code is clearly more 
accessible than treatises of  fiqh, the argument of  clarity is no more than 
a relative one. An expert in fiqh may find it as clear as the modern lawyer 
finds the code. Admittedly, however, Islamic law cannot be said to have 
internal uniformity, since plurality of  opinion – the so-called ijtiha>dic 
pluralism – is its defining feature par excellence. It is on the diversity 
of  its own character that, interestingly, it thrived (and insisted), and it is 
in it that it found the flexibility to accommodate, through variant legal 
norms, different situations that would otherwise come under the same 
codified rule. The plurality of  opinion answered not only the multiplicity 
of  particular and special situations but the exigencies of  legal change.45 
Its plurality ran counter to the spirit of  uniformity, since homogenization 
– in its modern meaning and effect -- was largely absent from its agenda. 
And since its interest lay in the individual as a singular worshipper of  
God, there was no need for an abstract and universalizing language. Most 
importantly, however, it is the declaratory nature of  the code as well as 
its uniformity of  substance and legal effect that betrayed a will-to-power 
that emanated from the higher offices of  the nation-state; by contrast, in 
44 See Bayitch, “Codification,” pp. 162-67.
45 Wael B. Hallaq, Authority, Continuity, and Change in Islamic Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 121-235.
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Islamic law such a will-to-power could not exist on any level beyond the 
purely abstract and theoretical (if  not the metaphysical and theological).
That codes must be systematic, clear and accessible is also a 
function of  the difference in roles played by the faqi>h, on the one hand, 
and the modern lawyer-judge, on the other. The modern lawyer-judge 
is the representative and agent of  the nation-state, an extension of  its 
agency, and one who studies and applies the code as technocrat. But 
she does not produce the law of  the code, a fact leading to far-reaching 
effects. The nation-state apparatus of  control and surveillance produced 
the obedient lawyer and judge – obedient, that is, to the commanding 
powers of  the state. Being a technocrat and a specialist in what has been 
termed “the province of  law,” the lawyer-judge is confined to the technical 
study of  law, which is the nation-state’s tool to accomplish control and 
order for the sake of  efficient management of  an economically productive 
citizenry. The faqi>h, on the other hand, served a different imperative, for 
long and for most of  the time transcending the limitations of  technocracy. 
Among the faqi>hs, the qa>d}i>s tended to serve as technocrats, but never all 
of  them. For qa>d}i>s wore other hats, so to speak, such as those of  the mufti> 
and the author-jurist.46 Thus a significant number, if  not a majority, of  
the faqi>hs were intellectuals who routinely engaged in specialized studies 
of  other disciplines, from history, theology and literature, to philosophy, 
logic, medicine and astronomy. Their desideratum was the discovery 
and articulation of  the law, and they marshaled their interdisciplinary 
knowledge toward the accomplishment of  that goal. They produced 
the law, and they accumulated the highest form of  authority, namely, the 
epistemic. They, the mujtahids and the leading mufti>s, were thus the public 
intellectuals who spoke truth to power. This can never be claimed to be 
an attribute of  the modern lawyer-judge.47
46 Wael B. Hallaq, Authority, pp. 166-74.
47 The judge’s judicial independence in the modern state, and thus his compe-
tence --as a judge-- to speak truth to power, are limited by the very law that the state 
installs to regulate the judge’s office and function. In other words, the judge’s empower-
ment (or delegated authority) to speak the truth cannot exceed that empowerment itself  
(or the bounds of  that authority). In contrast, in Islamic legal and political cultures, there 
was no such empowerment since the state in its modern meaning never existed, and the 
Shari‘a was itself  largely independent of  all legal and juristic constraints. Therefore, in 
the Islamic context, speaking truth to power was not predetermined by power’s power 
to delimit the scope of  truth.
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E. In Lieu of  a Conclusion
With this conceptual background in mind, the maqa>s}id, if  they 
are to be revived, must be refitted in a new world, which is dramatically 
different from its pre-modern counterpart and one that shows no signs 
of  disappearing any time soon.48 The refitting efforts must adopt one of  
two options, although neither can represent a mechanical arrangement. 
The readjustment is one that involves no less than a transplantation into 
a profoundly new legal ecology. The first option involves a recognition 
of  the permanency of  the status quo. Assuming that the maqa>s}id’s link 
with Arabicate ijtiha>dic hermeneutics is successfully severed – the whole 
point of  their rejuvenation as a viable way out of  the hermeneutical 
impasse -- they cannot escape being accommodated within a body politic, 
the modern state, wherein legal power is above and beyond them. They 
must, in other words, depend on an alternative hermeneutic that issues, 
not from an individualistic, socially-embedded, Arabicate-driven ijtiha>d, 
but from state-designated councils or committees that operate under 
the shadow of  state interests. Having been formed out of  the soil of  
ijtiha>dic pluralism, they must now cope with the processes and effects 
of  being recast into a code-like forms, the essential modus operandi of  
the nation-state. All this is inescapable, unless the state itself  undergoes 
major transformations.
In terms of  content, on the other hand, the sources (us}u>l) of  the 
maqa>s}id will, under the state, cease to be a hermeneutic that is dialectically 
based on society and text (which are located in opposition to political 
power), but rather a hermeneutic that incorporates the will of  the state 
and a vision of  enacting the “good citizen.” The text – however defined 
here -- and the hermeneutic are largely shaped by the state on behalf  of  
the citizen as a social being. The social order qua social order does not 
in and by itself  generate any law, nor does it remotely have the agency 
which had produced the mufti>, the author-jurist and the faqi>h. If  law 
is a reflection of  its sources, of  its hermeneutic, of  the kind of  legal 
profession producing it, then how can the maqasid continue to preserve a 
certain Islamic character (however it may be defined) under dramatically 
48 Even if  the theory of  the decline of  the state is to be taken seriously, any 
decline will not occur soon enough to minimize the urgency of  this “refitting.” On this 
theory, see van Creveld, Rise and Decline.
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different conditions where the sources, the hermeneutic and the legal 
profession share little, if  anything, with their pre-modern counterpart? 
How, no less importantly, can the maqa>s}id law (if  we were to add to this 
mix the inevitable effects of  capitalism) under the nation-state order 
accommodate and give voice to the subaltern? 
Furthermore, when once they were seen as the moral underpinning 
of  the social order and as an exemplary guideline of  conduct 
which generated willing submission – but by no means a systematic 
implementation of  “law and order” --, they would now, under the 
nation-state, acquire a disciplinarian fixity with which they had not been 
associated. Hand mutilation or capital punishment (protecting property 
and life, respectively) would not be a flexible hermeneutical exercise 
sporadically used to maintain social harmony (in a specific, localized social 
group) whenever the jurists and judges felt a limit had been breached, 
but the all-or-none punishment that must reflect the much cherished 
blind-justice. How could the cherished values that characterized -- indeed 
distinguished -- Islamic societies and made them what they are be, mutatis 
mutandis, maintained in the face of  such hegemonic transformations? How 
would the maqa>s}id maintain that minimalist essence that makes a society 
Muslim/Islamic, and distinct from others, in the face of  modernity’s 
powerfully homogenizing effects? The overarching estrangement of  
the maqa>s}id from their native soil does not alter only their form but 
also their substantive meaning and material contents. Perhaps most 
central in this transformation is the loss of  the moral order, or the moral 
community, upon which the application of  Islamic law depended and 
which it presupposed. If  the maqa>s}id universals are to have any genuine 
Islamic meaning and content, they must be situated in a morally-based 
community, in the sense that the socially-embedded moral code is 
systematically maintained as the driving engine of  the law, not the other 
way around. The loss of  the moral community is the quintessential 
triumph of  modernity. How this community can be revived under the 
clutches of  the modern project is perhaps the most central and urgent 
question of  all.
These challenges are formidable enough in the presence of  the 
irretrievable modern nation-state -- whatever form it may take in the 
Wael B. Hallaq
Al-Ja>mi‘ah, Vol. 49, No. 1, 2011 M/1432 H28
future.49 To install the maqa>s}id in a legal system in which the state is 
subservient to the Shari‘a –as many Muslims call for today-- is to argue 
for a more radical solution, and thus to face an even more formidable 
challenge. This is the second option, which would require the construction 
of  a new conception of  the law and legal morality, a new legal system, 
a new legal culture and education, a new economy, and a new moral 
community. All this, in other words, would require transcending 
modernity, the ultimate challenge facing the entirety of  humankind today.
49 Ibid.
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